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ABSTRACT. In Jogee and Ruddock, the Supreme Court/Privy Council decided that the law on 
secondary liability took a “wrong turn” in 1984 in the Privy Council’s decision in Chan 
Wing-Siu. Chan Wing-Siu’s contemplation/foresight-based fault element for secondary 
liability was alleged by the Supreme Court/Privy Council to have bucked a legal trend 
towards requiring that the secondary party intended to encourage or assist every one of the 
principal’s offences. This article presents an alternative history of secondary liability that 
explains a wider selection of cases from 1553-1984 than were considered in Jogee and 
Ruddock. On this alternative account, Chan Wing-Siu was simply a more explicit and 
intellectually honest decision than its predecessors. If this alternative view of history is 
accepted, the Supreme Court/Privy Council’s claim to be merely “correcting” (rather than 
substantively reforming) the law of secondary liability should be rejected. Doing so would 
make clearer a question that was side-stepped in Jogee and Ruddock, i.e. whether this reform 
should have been undertaken by the judiciary, rather than the legislature. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Parasitic accessorial liability”1 (PAL) allowed D1, a party sharing D2’s purpose to commit 
Offence A (e.g. burglary), to be held liable as a secondary party for D2’s further (“collateral”) 
Offence B (e.g. murder). What (controversially) distinguished PAL from “ordinary” 
accessorial liability (i.e. aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring) was that D1 could be 
liable for Offence B without proof that she encouraged or assisted
2
 its commission, let alone 
that she did so intentionally.
3
 In its modern incarnation, PAL required only that D1 had 
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foreseen the possibility that D2 might commit Offence B in furtherance of Offence A. The 
Privy Council confirmed this contemplation/foresight version of PAL in Chan Wing-Siu v R. 
(1984),
4
 a decision developed by the House of Lords in R. v Powell and English (1997).
5
 The 
Supreme Court/Privy Council claimed in R. v Jogee and Ruddock
6
 (hereafter Jogee) that 
Chan Wing-Siu represented a “wrong turn”.7 Consistent with a paper written in 2013 by Lord 
Toulson, who co-authored the unanimous judgment in Jogee,
8
 it was contended that before 
Chan Wing-Siu secondary liability required intentional encouragement or assistance
9
 of each 
of the principal’s crimes. Foresight that a particular offence might be committed, it was 
alleged, was evidence of the required intention to encourage or assist that particular offence, 
not an independent fault element as Chan Wing-Siu decided.
10
 The Supreme Court/Privy 
Council claimed they were thus merely “correcting” the error in Chan Wing-Siu. This 
response enabled them to largely sidestep the constitutional question of whether the courts, or 
instead Parliament, should be responsible for changing the law.
11
 
It will be argued here that, far from being an invention of the mid-1980s, PAL existed 
consistently, in some form, from at least the sixteenth century.
12
 Chan Wing-Siu was not an 
anomaly, but simply confirmation that PAL’s limits had narrowed by the latter half of the 
twentieth century to require “subjective” contemplation of Crime B. Chan Wing-Siu was 
simply more intellectually honest regarding the true position of secondary parties relative to 
Offence B than previous cases had been.
13
 The House of Lords’ later decision in Powell and 
English was even more so. Jogee was thus not mere common law housekeeping. It was 
substantive and significant reform of the law. This alternative view of legal history raises 
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afresh questions about the constitutional limits of judicial reform of the criminal law, i.e. 
“judicial activism”. 
The majority of this paper is dedicated to presenting an account of PAL’s 
development through the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries (Parts II-VI). Part VII explains 
briefly why this alternative history clears the way to seeing the constitutional concern raised 
by Jogee.  
Before moving further, two caveats must be noted. First, most reported cases relevant 
to PAL involve homicide. The attendant rules on felony murder could thus have a distorting 
effect until their abolition in 1957.
14
 Secondly, the defendant was only permitted to speak in 
his defence in all cases by section 1 of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898. Beforehand, the 
ability of the courts to assess the defendant’s “subjective” thought processes was limited, and 
thus reliance on “objective” factors was more commonplace. It is submitted that, if these 
caveats are borne in mind, it remains possible to doubt the Supreme Court/Privy Council’s 
history of PAL. 
 
 
II. THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 
The sixteenth century law on accessorial liability was undeveloped,
15
 but an early version of 
PAL is detectable.
16
 In R. v Salisbury
17
 a servant joined in a fight involving his master 
(Offence A). During the fight, the master killed another combatant (Offence B).
18
 The servant 
was ignorant of his master’s pre-existing plan to commit murder.19 The servant was held 
liable for manslaughter, because he was ignorant of the murderous plan, and also lacked the 
“malice prepense”20 required for murder. This decision was generous.21 In the mid-sixteenth 
century, the sole question appears to have been whether the collateral offending – even if 
unforeseeable – occurred in pursuit of the parties’ common unlawful purpose. For example, in 
R. v Herbert,
22
 a group was assembled by Herbert to steal from and fight Mansell, but 
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apparently did not intend to kill anyone. A disturbance ensued, and a stone thrown by a 
member of Herbert’s group (aimed at someone else) killed Mansell’s sister. Half of the 
judges
23
 thought that Herbert’s group was liable for her murder, given its connection to their 
initial unlawful purpose. In essence, “if a man takes the risk of doing an unlawful act, he must 
take all the consequences of that act even though he had neither intended nor foreseen 
them”.24 For the remaining judges, the group was liable for murder only if it was proved that 
Mansell’s sister had come in defence of her brother, binding the murder to the group’s initial 
unlawful purpose. If Mansell’s sister had not sided with either party, then her death was a 
separate incident, and Herbert’s group could be liable, at most, for manslaughter. The 
evidence could not resolve this factual issue, but the law was clear.
25
 Importantly, it is 
implicit in the approach of both groups of judges that, had the initial purpose of Herbert’s 
group been lawful, there would not have been liability for murder or manslaughter, at least 
without evidence of actual encouragement or assistance being given to the stone thrower.
26
  
The judges’ approach in Herbert is consistent with PAL. A party to a common 
unlawful purpose could be liable for a collateral offence despite not intentionally assisting or 
encouraging it – the distinguishing mark of PAL. The reaches of this early PAL doctrine are, 
nevertheless, unclear. In murder cases, the felony murder rule removed any need for proof of 
fault with regard to killing.
27
 Even if no felony were commanded, however, a collateral 
murder would be the responsibility of all parties to the common purpose.
28
 Furthermore, 
although those who commanded “beatings” were responsible for collateral murders, an 
intention to beat was sufficient mens rea for murder at the time.
29
 Examples not involving 
murder are thus more useful.  
One rare example of a (hypothetical) case not involving murder is provided in 
Plowden’s commentary on R. v Saunders and Archer.30 For Plowden, it was “reasonable” to 
hold secondary parties liable for what “follows from [the secondary party’s procurement of 
the principal’s offence], but not from any other distinct thing”.31 Collateral crimes were not 
always “distinct things”, an approach that stretched beyond murder. For instance, if a person 
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 Technically judges, Serjeants and law officers. 
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 Kaye, “Murder and Manslaughter”, 580. 
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 See, e.g., R. v Wright (1562) Gell’s Reports, reproduced in J.H. Baker (ed.), Reports from the Lost Notebooks 
of Sir James Dyer: Vol. 2 (London 1994), 435. 
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 Baker, Oxford History, 555-556. 
30
 (1573) 2 Plowd. 473. See, further, J.H. Baker, “R v Saunders and Archer (1573)” in P. Handler, H. Mares and 
I. Williams (eds.), Landmark Cases in Criminal Law (Oxford, forthcoming). 
31
 R. v Saunders and Archer (1573) 2 Plowd. 473, 475. 
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commanded robbery (Offence A), and more severe violence was used against the victim 
(Offence B), the commander was liable for both offences.
32
 No explanation regarding the 
connection between the offences is given, so no intention to encourage Offence B is 
mentioned.  
Plowden’s “distinct things” lacked a “connection or affinity” with the secondary 
party’s command.33  For instance, if the defendant specified that V1’s house should be burned 
and the principal deliberately burned down V2’s house, the defendant would not be a 
secondary party to the property damage. The principal’s offence would be “another distinct 
thing, to which [the commander] gave no assent nor command”.34 Similarly, if the parties’ 
original unlawful purpose was accomplished, and the collateral offence occurred afterwards, 
distinct evidence of assistance or encouragement in relation to the collateral offence had to be 
proved.
35
 
It is not clear how far beyond commanding (counselling and procuring, in modern 
terms)
36
 Plowden’s comments went, or what the “assent” he referred to involved. These 
points do not harm the thesis that PAL existed in the sixteenth century. It did not appear 
necessary for there to be, even in homicide cases, a common purpose to additionally resist by 
force opposition to the plan, although brief references to such resolutions appear.
37
 As will be 
seen below, the common purpose to resist opposition was to reappear at various points in 
history, and was capitalised upon in Jogee. 
 
 
III. THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 
The focus on collateral offence committed in pursuit of the parties’ common purpose was 
maintained, as far as the reported sources suggest, in the early-to-mid seventeenth century 
authorities – beyond, it appears, procurement cases: “when several men joyn in an unlawful 
act they are all guilty of whatever happens upon it… For a man must take heed how he joineth 
in any unlawful act as fighting is, for if he doth, he is guilty of all that follows.”38 
                                                 
32
 ibid. 
33
 ibid. 
34
 ibid. 
35
 Kaye, “Murder and Manslaughter”, 594. 
36
 See E. Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (London 1642), 182. 
37
 See, e.g., Snook’s Case (1560) Sav. 67. Although it may have been a “necessary assumption” that such a 
resolution existed (Baker, Oxford History, 556), the cases are unclear. See, further, R. v Griffith (1553) 12 
Plowd. 97; Lord Dacre’s Case (1535) Moore K.B. 86. 
38
 R. v Stanley (1662) Kelyng J 86, 87. cf. R. v Hyde (1672) 1 Hale P.C. 537. 
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The law was, however, beginning to narrow. A useful contrast can be drawn between 
two hypothetical cases addressed by the Court of King’s Bench in 1692:39 
 
3. Whether if A. heard B. threaten to kill C. and some days after A. shall be with B. upon 
some other design, where C. shall pass by, or come into the place where A. and B. are, and C. 
shall be killed by B. A. standing by, without contributing to the fact, his sword not being 
drawn, nor any malice ever appearing on A.’s part against C. whether A. will be guilty of the 
murder of C.? 
 
Ans. A. in this case would not be guilty either of murder or manslaughter. 
 
Here, there is no common unlawful purpose, and so even the nascent PAL doctrine recognised 
in the sixteenth century would be inapplicable: actual assistance or encouragement of the 
murder (presumably provided intentionally) would be required in such a case. 
 
 5. Whether a person, knowing of the design of another to lie in wait to assault a third person, 
and accompanying him in that design, if it shall happen that the third person be killed at that 
time, in the presence of him who knew of that design, and accompanied the other in it, be 
guilty in law of the same crime with the party who had that design, and killed him, though he 
had no actual hand in his death? 
 
Ans. If a person is privy to a felonious design, or to a design of committing any personal 
violence, and accompanieth the party in putting that design in execution, though he may think 
it will not extend so far as death, but only beating, and hath no personal hand, or doth 
otherwise contribute to it than by his being with the other person, when he executeth his 
design of assaulting the party, if the party dieth, they are both guilty of murder. For by his 
accompanying him in the design, he shews his approbation of it, and gives the party more 
courage to put it in execution; which is an aiding, abetting, assisting and comforting of him, as 
laid in the indictment. 
 
The answer to question 5 is reminiscent of the two-offence analysis employed in 
modern PAL cases. A is intentionally encouraging B only to beat C (Offence A), yet he is 
liable for C’s murder (Offence B).40 An intention to beat was, however, sufficient fault for 
murder at the time,
41
 and other seventeenth century authorities suggest that ignorance of the 
principal’s plan to kill might (as in Salisbury) relieve the defendant of secondary liability for 
murder.
42
 Less instructive still is the alternative example where A intentionally encouraged B 
to commit a felony, because of the felony murder rule. 
It is worth noting, before proceeding, that the court viewed question 5 as being an 
example of aiding and abetting; the encouragement for Offence B came from supporting the 
principal’s plan to commit Offence A. The long-running dispute about whether PAL was truly 
                                                 
39
 Lord Mohun’s Trial (1692) Holt, K.B. 479, 480. 
40
 See, similarly, E. Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (London 1644), 51. 
41
 ibid. 
42
 E.g. R. v Thody (1673) 1 Freem. 514. 
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a form of aiding and abetting, or a distinct head of liability, does not appear to have got off 
the ground by this point in history. It will, however, be returned to at various points below. 
Hale, writing in the 1670s (albeit his work was not published until the 1730s), also 
includes examples structurally reminiscent of PAL, but restricts secondary liability – at least 
in procurement and counselling (accessory before the fact) cases – to “objectively” probable 
results of the initial common purpose. First, “If A. command B. to beat C., and he beat him so 
that he die thereof, it is murder in B. and A.”43 No explicit connection was required between 
the beating and the death. By contrast: “If A. counsel or command B. to beat C. with a small 
wand or rod, which could not in all human reason cause death, if B. beat C. with a great club, 
or wound him with a sword, whereof he dies, it seems, that A. is not accessory, because there 
was no command of death, nor of any thing, that could probably cause death, and B. hath 
varied from the command in substance, not in circumstance.”44 The “compass of [the parties’] 
original intention”45 – could stretch only so far, and its outer limit was, at least in relation to 
accessories before the fact (counsellors and procurers), probable collateral offending.
46
 
Importantly, given later developments, Hale maintains that, for principals in the 
second degree (aiders and abettors), certain collateral offences were presumed to be within the 
parties’ common purpose to commit felonies: if a group embarks on a plan to steal deer, “the 
law presumes they came all with intent to oppose all that should hinder them in that design, 
and consequently when one kild the keeper, it is presumed to be the act of all, because 
pursuant to that intent… tho there were no express intention to kill any person in the first 
enterprise… the law presumes they come to make good their design against all opposition”.47 
If the group’s joint purpose was lawful, however, secondary liability for murder required 
proof it was actually encouraged or assisted.
48
 Embarking on Offence A was itself, then, the 
basis for a presumption that opposition to Offence A would be met with force sufficient to 
ground a conviction for murder (Offence B) if death resulted. In other words, Hale’s writing 
about the law in the 1670s is compatible with the existence of PAL, even if a distinction 
between accessories before the fact (probability test) and principals in the second degree (the 
scope of the common purpose, with – at least in felonies – additional presumed force, test) 
was visible. 
                                                 
43
 M. Hale, Historia Placitorum Coronæ, vol. 1 (London 1736), 435, 617 (hereafter Hale, Historia). 
44
 ibid. 436. 
45
 ibid. 444. 
46
 ibid. 443.  
47
 ibid, 443-444 (emphasis added). cf. W. Hawkins, The Pleas of the Crown, 4th ed. (London 1762), vol. 2, ch. 
29, s. 8.  
48
 Hale, Historia, 444. 
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The law’s approach continued to narrow during the eighteenth century. 
 
 
IV. THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
In R. v Plummer, Holt CJ said that, if a group of smugglers were to be liable for the murder of 
an officer committed by one of their number:
49
 
 
 The killing must be in pursuance of that unlawful act, and not collateral to it. As for the 
purpose, if divers come to hunt in a park, and the keeper commands them to stand, and resists 
them; if one of the company kills the keeper, it is not only murder in him, but in all the rest 
then present, that came upon that design, for it was done in pursuance of that unlawful act… 
 But suppose that they coming into the park to hunt, before they see the keeper, there is an 
accidental quarrel happens amongst them, and one kills the other, it will not be murder but 
manslaughter; and in the rest that were not concerned in that quarrel it will not be felony. 
[Emphasis added.] 
 
The implication is that no knowledge of the principal’s further offence was necessary if it was 
committed in pursuance of a common unlawful purpose. The (in fact) collateral offence was 
only (in law) a collateral offence if it was not done in pursuance of the initial unlawful 
purpose. This inclusion of what were, in fact, collateral offences within the parties’ “common 
purpose” was an intellectual dishonesty that was to dog judgments until Chan Wing-Siu. 
In R. v Ashton, Holt CJ gave an additional example: “Two, three or more, are doing an 
unlawful act, as abusing the passers-by in a street or highway, if one of them kill a passer-by 
it is murder by all”.50 There is no mention of the need for a common plan to commit murder, 
or even contemplation that murder might happen. Furthermore, there is no felony. There is a 
simple connection between the unlawful abuse (Offence A) and the murder (Offence B) that 
flows from it. This is, structurally, reminiscent of PAL. A similar, two-step analysis can be 
applied to R. v Wallis, where it was suggested that: “If a man begins a riot… and the same riot 
continue, and an officer is killed, he that began the riot… is a… murderer; though he did not 
do the fact”.51 Again, liability for Offence B (murder) was imposed on the basis that it was an 
incident of the common purpose to commit Offence A (affray/rioting). 
Assuming the initial common purpose of the parties was illegal,
52
 it was only if 
murder was not connected to Offence A – as in R. v Hodgson,53 where a boy, unconnected 
                                                 
49
 (1701) Kel. J. 109, 113-114. 
50
 (1703) 12 Mod. 256, 256. 
51
 (1703) 1 Salk. 334, 335. 
52
 cf. R. v Borthwick (1779) 1 Doug. 207. 
53
 (1730) 1 Leach 6. 
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with an affray, was killed – that liability for Offence B was ruled out in the absence of explicit 
assistance or encouragement. Holt CJ and Pollexfen CJ thought that the group in Hodgson 
was to be convicted of murder partially on the basis that they had armed themselves with 
offensive weapons.
54
 Holt CJ delivered the opinions in Plummer and Ashton, so it is plausible 
that the weapons were relevant to establishing the probable dangers posed by the original 
unlawful purpose, suggesting that the killing was committed in furtherance of that purpose, 
and was not a distinct act. 
The law’s approach thus does not appear to have moved on a great deal by the 1730s. 
Contemporary secondary literature does, however, suggest that the probability of collateral 
offending remained important, at least sometimes. Foster
55
 corroborates Hale’s comments 
about actions in pursuit of criminal ventures in cases of counselling and procuring: if “A. 
adviseth B. to rob C., he doth rob him, and in so doing either upon resistance made, or to 
conceal the fact, or upon any other motive operating at the time of the robbery, killeth him. A. 
is accessory to this murder.” 56  He explains that: “The advice, solicitation, or orders in 
substance were pursued, and were extremely flagitious on the part of A. The events, though 
possibly falling beyond his original intention, were in the ordinary course of things the 
probable consequences of what B. did under the influence, and at the instigation of A.”57 In 
cases involving counsellors and procurers, the focus was thus on what was probable, rather 
than intended. It must be accepted that, when Foster was writing, probability and intention 
would have been conceptually closer than they are nowadays, yet Foster distinguishes 
intention from probability. This unsettles the assumption in Jogee that a “subjective” version 
of Foster’s probability test would be the modern concept of intention.58 The “subjective” 
equivalent of “objective” probability, i.e. foreseeability, is presumably “subjective” foresight 
of the relevant probability, which is (almost) what Chan Wing-Siu endorsed. 
The probability test certainly softened the law’s approach: a bare felony (robbery) was 
not enough to affix liability for murder – death had to be a probable result. This perhaps 
explains an awkward aspect of Foster’s account.59 He cites a 1697 case, where three soldiers 
went to steal apples.
60
 One soldier was confronted by the orchard owner’s son and murdered 
him. The other soldiers were acquitted of murder. They were engaged in “small inconsiderate 
                                                 
54
 At 6. 
55
 See Jogee, at [18]-[20]. 
56
 M. Foster, Crown Law (Oxford 1762), 370 (hereafter Foster, Crown Law). See, too, W. Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England: Book the Fourth, 7th ed. (Oxford 1775), 37. 
57
 Foster, Crown Law, 370 (emphasis in original). 
58
 Jogee, at [73]. 
59
 cf. Toulson, “Complicity”, at p. 237. 
60
 Foster, Crown Law, 353. 
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trespass”, and it was not clear that they had a “general resolution against all opposers”.61 This 
result might appear puzzling: Offence B (murder) seems to have been committed in pursuit of 
Offence A (stealing apples), and that was enough – it appears – to found secondary liability in 
the seventeenth century. But the answer to this quandary might be probability – if that test 
was to be applied beyond accessories before the fact. In the soldiers’ case, murder was not a 
probable consequence, given the “minor” nature of the common purpose to steal apples. This 
analysis (which is, it is submitted, less ahistorical than an alternative one based on 
“conditional intention”) could be used to explain away the orchard example, and indeed it 
later was.
62
 
By the end of the eighteenth century, then, the question of whether Offence B was a 
probable consequence of the common intent to commit Offence A had begun to assume 
importance, most clearly in cases of accessories before the fact, but perhaps also in cases of 
principals in the second degree. Admittedly, what the parties knew (for example, whether the 
principal (in the first degree) was armed or not) or had planned was relevant to the probability 
assessment.
63
 The Supreme Court/Privy Council agreed with this general picture in Jogee,
64
 
but alleged that things changed markedly in the nineteenth century. 
 
 
V. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
In Jogee, it was contended that:
65
 
 
Cases in the nineteenth century showed … a significant change of approach. It was no longer 
sufficient … to prove that the principal’s conduct was a probable consequence, in the ordinary 
course of things, of the criminal enterprise … The prosecution had to prove that it was part of 
their common purpose, should the occasion arise. 
 
The Supreme Court/Privy Council is right about the intellectual muddle the courts created in 
the nineteenth century (finding the collateral offence to be part of the parties’ “common 
purpose” when it was, in fact, a departure from it). That conclusion does not, however, 
ground a requirement that the defendant had to intend to encourage or assist every one of the 
                                                 
61
 ibid. 
62
 R. v Jackson (1857) 7 Cox. C.C. 357, discussed below. cf. W. Wilson and D. Ormerod, “Simply Harsh to 
Fairly Simple: Joint Enterprise Reform” [2015] Crim. L.R. 3, 8 (hereafter Wilson and Ormerod, “Joint 
Enterprise Reform”). 
63
 K.J.M. Smith, “Criminal Law” in W. Cornish et al. (eds.), The Oxford History of the Laws of England: 
Volume XIII: 1820-1914 Fields of Development (Oxford 2010), 1 at p. 291 (hereafter Smith, “Criminal Law”). 
64
 At [18], [20]. 
65
 Jogee, at [21]. 
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principal’s offences if he was to be a secondary party to them. This becomes clear when a full 
view of the cases is taken. 
East suggests that the presumption of a resolution to resist opposition when a felony 
was embarked upon remained in 1803,
66
 but also mentions the secondary party’s 
“contemplation” of the principal’s crime(s). 67  It is not clear what relevance such 
“contemplation” had to determining the liability of parties – or indeed what “contemplation” 
was taken by East to entail – but it is significant that even by 1803 the language of 
“contemplation” was used in relation to secondary liability. As demonstrated below, 
“contemplation” became very important in the early twentieth century, and was important to 
Chan Wing-Siu itself. 
During the nineteenth century, the presumption regarding resistance gave way to the 
necessity of proof that the parties’ “common purpose” included such contingencies,68 but 
caution must be exercised when pondering whether this required proof that the parties 
actually shared a common intention. Some authorities might support this jump. In R. v White, 
it was held that: “if the prisoners came with the same illegal purpose, and both determined to 
resist, the act of one would fix guilt upon both…”. 69  Rather than presuming such a 
determination existed, the court found that White’s running away as soon as the alarm was 
raised secured his acquittal for the principal’s violent crime. The Supreme Court/Privy 
Council is thus right insofar as it does appear that the parties would need to be proved to have 
“determined” to resist opposition with force. But it remains something of a leap from the 
common “determination” mentioned in White to a discrete intention to assist or encourage all 
of the principal’s offences. It is not certain how far White departed from the earlier probability 
model. Lawyers at the time still presumed natural and probable consequences of actions to be 
“intended”.70 It would thus be unwise to read statements about “determination” to be broadly 
synonymous with intention, and then use that to support a thesis involving the modern 
understanding of intention. 
The concept of a common resolution to resist opposition was opaque. The first edition 
of Russell on Crime (1819) states that principals in the second degree (aiders and abettors) 
                                                 
66
 E.H. East, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown (London 1803), 257. 
67
 ibid. 259. 
68
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69
 (1806) R. & R. 99, 101. 
70
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Lawyers, Legislators and Theorists: Developments in English Criminal Jurisprudence 1800-1957 (Oxford 
1998), 166-171 (hereafter Smith, Lawyers). 
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must have “a general resolution against all opposers … whether such resolution appears … to 
have been actually and explicitly entered into by the confederates, or may be reasonably 
collected from their number, arms, or behaviour, at or before the scene of the action”.71 The 
“resolution” to resist opposition could thus be tacit, but it is unclear what such a “resolution” 
amounted to. If this “resolution” was a synonym for intention, it is noteworthy that the word 
“resolution” remained unchanged in the text by 1950,72 when the law’s approach to fault 
elements (and principally intention) had begun to solidify.
73
 Significantly, when assessing the 
Supreme Court/Privy Council’s historical view, the common purpose scenario was juxtaposed 
in the 1819 edition with liability on the basis of having “actually aided and abetted him in the 
fact”,74 suggesting that PAL was becoming at least a special variety of aiding and abetting, if 
not a discrete doctrine, by the early nineteenth century. 
The cases were similarly unclear about how a common “resolution” to resist 
opposition was proved. For instance, in R. v Hawkins,
75
 some poachers beat up a gamekeeper. 
The principal returned later and robbed the gamekeeper. The common purpose was assumed 
to be “to kill game, and perhaps to resist the keepers”.76 The use of the word perhaps suggests 
that, even when violence was actually used, the courts might not find that a common purpose 
to use it had existed, but this idea is not explored further. 
Aside from concerns over what a common “resolution” to resist opposition involved, 
and how it was to be proved, it was not always insisted upon. In Redford v. Birley and Others, 
Holroyd J noted that if a group’s purpose was lawful, it would not be liable for the principal’s 
crimes unless actual aiding and abetting were proved, but:
77
  
 
If persons go together, go united in an unlawful design, to commit a felony, or a breach of the 
peace, and, in the course of effecting that purpose any one does an act in pursuit of the 
common purpose, they are all answerable because that which they set about, upon a common 
design, was originally unlawful. 
 
                                                 
71
 W.O. Russell, A Treatise on Crimes and Misdemeanors, vol. 1 (London 1819), 31-32 (hereafter Russell, 
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unchanged into the 1920s: e.g. H. Delacombe and R.E. Ross, Archbold’s Pleading, Evidence & Practice in 
Criminal Cases, 26th ed. (London 1922), 1438. 
72
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73
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 Russell, Treatise, 33 (emphasis added). 
75
 (1828) 3 Car. & P. 392. 
76
 At 393. 
77
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The probability of Offence B’s occurrence is not noted in Reford v Birley and Others 
(perhaps suggesting that approach was still restricted to accessories before the fact), never 
mind the resolution to resist opposition.
78
 Holroyd J’s statement would not look out of place 
in the early seventeenth century. 
 The law’s approach to most issues at the time was inconsistent,79 and so discrepancies 
are not unexpected. The suggestion in Jogee is that the law began to solidify in R. v Collison 
(1831):
80
 
 
To make the prisoner a principal, the jury must be satisfied that, when he and his companion 
went out with a common guilty purpose of committing the felony of stealing apples, they also 
entertained the common guilty purpose of resisting to death, or with extreme violence, any 
persons who might endeavour to apprehend them; but if they had only the common purpose of 
stealing apples, and the violence of the prisoner’s companion was merely the result of the 
situation in which he found himself, and proceeded from the impulse of the moment, without 
any previous concert [the secondary party would be acquitted]. [Emphasis added.] 
 
Collison is similar, factually, to Foster’s orchard example, and suffers from the same 
difficulty concerning the probability of murder being committed (if that test had begun to 
filter into aiding and abetting). Garrow B’s judgment is, however, supportive of the Supreme 
Court/Privy Council’s historical thesis that the common purpose, in murder cases, had to 
include (if conditionally) “severe violence”.81 It is not clear, though, what Garrow B meant by 
“entertained the common guilty purpose”, and what evidence would have established the 
necessary “concert”. The Supreme Court/Privy Council’s reading is that an intention to assist 
or encourage severe violence would be required. But “entertaining” the purpose of 
committing a collateral offence could equally have meant contemplating the risk of a member 
of the enterprise needing to use force in pursuit of the common purpose, and continuing 
regardless. That reading of Collison would be consistent with the modern cases on PAL, such 
as Chan Wing-Siu, insofar as mere contemplation of Offence B does not entail an intention to 
encourage or assist Offence B (as the Supreme Court/Privy Council noted correctly).  
Other statements from that period are similarly opaque. In R. v Duffey,
82
 decided a 
year before Collison, an important question was whether the secondary party was “cognizant” 
                                                 
78
 cf. E.E. Deacon, A Digest of the Criminal Law of England, vol. 2 (London 1831), 907 (emphasising both the 
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at p. 7. 
80
 (1831) 4 Car. & P. 565, 566. 
81
 Jogee, at [22]. 
82
 (1830) 1 Lewin 194. 
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of the principal’s collateral offence and “concurring” in it.83 It was not clear what the relevant 
“cognition” and “concurrence” required. 
Collison’s resolution to use force appears in other nineteenth century cases, but the 
matter of what could establish it remained unclear.
84
 In R. v Scotton,
85
 the defendants 
(poachers) were not liable as the principal was alone at the time of the shooting, and there was 
no evidence that they had intentionally helped or encouraged him to shoot. This decision 
might support a necessary requirement of help or encouragement, provided intentionally – 
supporting the historical argument in Jogee. The judgment in Scotton is, however, short, and 
the relevance of the alleged secondary parties’ absence might have been that the original 
common purpose of the parties to poach was exhausted, rendering the principal’s shooting a 
gamekeeper his responsibility only. That principle can exist alongside a form of PAL, which 
simply imposed liability for unintended collateral offences committed in pursuit of the 
original unlawful purpose. 
 R. v Macklin and Murphy
86
 suggests the Collison approach was, anyway, generous to 
defendants:
87
 
 
[I]f several persons act together in pursuance of a common intent, every act done in 
furtherance of such intent by each of them is, in law, done by all. The act, however, must be 
done in pursuance of the common intent. If several men were to intend and agree together to 
frighten a constable, and one were to shoot him through the head, such an act would affect the 
individual only by whom it was done. 
 
There is no requirement, here, to show that a collateral offence was more than a probable 
consequence (assuming that deliberate, as opposed to panicked, shooting is not a probable 
consequence of frightening) of the execution of the common purpose. All that is clear is that 
an action completely divorced from the initial “common intent” was not something to which 
secondary liability would attach. If one is not distracted by the word “intent” (still used 
loosely at the time), this view is consistent with the older authorities, and the existence of a 
(harsh) PAL doctrine. 
 Similarly, in R. v Howell, Littledale J told the jury that:
88
 
 
                                                 
83
 At 194. See, too, the headnote in R. v Cruse (1838) 8 Car. & P. 541. 
84
 E.g. R. v Doddridge (1860) 8 Cox. C.C. 335. 
85
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86
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87
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88
 (1839) 9 Car. & P. 437, 448. 
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[A]ll those who assemble themselves together with a felonious intent, the execution thereof 
causes either the felony intended or any other to be committed, or with intent to commit a 
trespass, the execution whereof causes a felony to be committed, and continuing together 
abetting one another until they have actually put their design into execution [were liable]. 
[Emphasis added.] 
 
There is, here, no requirement of a common design beyond the first felony, or “trespass” 
(misdemeanor). Littledale J continued that, “It appears … that there are cases in our law, 
where persons setting out engaged in a particular object, and in promotion of that object a 
felony was committed, though not originally intended, and where death ensued… all have 
been found guilty of murder or manslaughter”.89 If what marks PAL out is the fact that the 
secondary party is held liable for Offence B, without the need to have intended to encourage 
or assist Offence B, then Littledale J appears to be explaining PAL in 1839. (Indeed, the 
felony murder rule cannot be used as an explanation here, as the common purpose seems to 
have led to a separate felony which led to death.) Other cases from that period can be 
analysed similarly.
90
 If Collison did in fact require an actual intention to assist or encourage 
the collateral offence, then this requirement was applied inconsistently.
91
 
 Bramwell B’s direction to the jury in R. v Jackson raises further doubts about the 
necessity of an intention to encourage or assist Offence B:
92
 
 
[I]f two persons are engaged in the pursuit of an unlawful object … and in the pursuit of that 
common object, one of them does an act which … amounts to murder in him, it is murder in 
the other also. The cases which have been referred to by the prisoner’s counsel [Howell, and 
Foster’s orchard example] may be explained in this way. The object for which the parties went 
out was comparatively a trifling one, and it is almost impossible to suppose that if one had 
committed a murder while engaged in pursuit of such an object, the act could have been done 
in furtherance of the common object they had in view, which was comparatively so 
unimportant. 
 
In short, the probability of violence being used was relevant not to an intention to encourage 
or assist it, but simply in working out whether it was committed in pursuit of the original 
common purpose. 
Further support for this view comes from R. v Harrington,
93
 where Martin B simply 
asked the jury if the death had occurred in pursuit of the common purpose to commit a breach 
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of the peace and assault. Harrington was cited in the 1896 edition of Russell on Crime as an 
example of when a common purpose to resist oppressors was established,
94
 when there is no 
mention in the report of any purpose to do more than breach the peace and commit an assault. 
It is at least possible, then, that the common “resolution” was, in fact, determined by 
something other than (so to speak) actual intention, perhaps even the probability assessment 
that was already employed in relation to accessories before the fact. This was muddled by talk 
of probable consequences being within a “common purpose”, which meant some collateral 
(i.e. unintended) offences were artificially brought within a “common purpose” that did not 
exist factually. This confusion is not unexpected. Intention would have been presumed on the 
basis of probable consequences of the defendant’s acts, and so references to “resolutions” or 
“intentions” must be read in that light. It was certainly not clear, by the mid-nineteenth 
century, that anything more demanding than contemplation of the principal’s probable 
collateral crime was required.
95
 Even contemplation might have been unnecessary, if 
collateral offending was probable. 
 The second half of the nineteenth century, following the passing of the Accessories 
and Abettors Act 1861, saw little clarity added. In R. v Franz,
96
 the jury was directed that it 
had to be sure that, in the light of all the evidence, a murder was committed to enable the 
planned burglary, or any other felony, before the parties were all liable for it as secondary 
parties. The reporters record that the doctrine that simply being involved in the burglary was 
enough to secure liability for additional offences was “long since exploded”. 97  But that 
doctrine, influenced strongly by the harshest incarnation of the felony murder rule, had since 
been supplemented by ones asking if the collateral offence was in pursuit of the common 
purpose and, at least in the cases of counselling and procuring, one asking whether the 
collateral offending was a probable outcome of pursuing the common purpose.
 
Even if the 
reporters’ posited “active or passive” participation in the collateral crime was meant as an 
additional ingredient of liability, it is not clear what it required. Could it be satisfied by 
contemplation of the need to cause such injury, as some previous cases can be read to 
suggest? Finally, it will be noted that the “resolution” in Franz (to inflict injury) is less 
demanding than the one in Collison (to use “extreme violence” or kill).98 A two-stage analysis 
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of Franz in terms of Offence A (injury) and Offence B (murder) is thus possible, suggesting it 
was not necessarily the burglary doing the work in establishing liability for Offence B. 
Other authorities are harder to explain. For example, the footnoted commentary to R. v 
Luck explains that the law’s approach was more “humane” by 1862, because there had to be 
“a common design to commit a felony, and a felony homicidal in nature and likely to lead to 
homicide”.99 Similarly, in R. v Turner, Channell B held that there must be a common purpose 
to use “murderous violence” before all parties could be liable for murder.100 There is still no 
indication, however, of how these cases built on the approach developed in the eighteenth 
century. The footnote in Luck speaks, for example, of felonies “likely to lead to homicide”, 
suggesting that a probability focus was beginning to seep into cases involving principals in 
the second degree. Turner is harder to square with a probability-based analysis, but the matter 
of how a common purpose to use “murderous violence” was to be proved was unaddressed. 
All that was clear was that if the common purpose was to beat the victim, but the principal 
produced and used a knife, which the other parties did not know about, only the principal was 
liable for murder.
101
 That analysis is consistent, however, with a probability-based account of 
PAL: murder was less likely to flow from a beating than from a knife attack. 
Later cases are, admittedly, difficult to fit into the probability assessment model of 
PAL, suggesting it might have remained limited to counselling and procuring. In R. v Skeet, 
Pollock CB noted that there could be secondary liability “where all the parties were aware 
that deadly weapons are taken with a view to inflict death or commit felonious violence, if 
resistance is offered”.102 “Awareness” is, however, a loose term.103 A person is not only aware 
of a possible outcome if she intends that possible outcome (I can be aware that someone 
might die if I x simply by believing that to be a possible, if unlikely, result of x-ing). This 
casts doubt on the claim in Jogee that a discrete intention to assist or encourage the principal’s 
collateral offending was required. Mere awareness was apparently sufficient to establish a 
“felonious design to carry out the unlawful purpose at all hazards, and whatever may be the 
consequences”,104 suggesting that the “common design/intention” was (still) a construct, and 
its limits were set sometimes by probability and other times by contemplation.
105
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The way in which Skeet was interpreted in contemporary secondary sources is 
instructive. For example, the 1867 edition of Archbold states that: “it is not sufficient that the 
common purpose is merely unlawful; it must either be felonious, or if it be to commit a 
misdemeanor, then there must be evidence to show that the parties engaged intended to carry 
it out at all hazards”.106 The use of “either” here suggests that if Offence A was a felony, then, 
liability for murder could flow in the absence of a common resolve to resist at all costs 
(perhaps a simple application of felony murder). There was thus no universal requirement of 
intention to assist or encourage collateral offending. If this was an erroneous statement of the 
law, it was not corrected, even by the time of the 26
th
 edition, published in 1922.
107
 
The Supreme Court/Privy Council based its account of the nineteenth century law on 
only five of the above-mentioned cases (Collison, Macklin, Luck, Turner and Skeet). Enough 
has been done to suggest that these cases were “exceptional”,108 “progressive”109 statements 
of the law, unclear in their precise implications, and unrepresentative of the entirety of 
contemporary jurisprudence. Indeed, by the close of the nineteenth century, it appeared that 
probability/foreseeability was becoming a standard test, beyond cases of counselling and 
procuring. In 1877, for instance, Russell on Crime recorded that a party would be liable for 
collateral offences that he “ought to have known” would follow from the common purpose.110 
Although perhaps “editorial kite-flying”,111 this statement remained in subsequent editions 
and is found in the 1950 edition, edited by arch “subjectivist” J.W.C. Turner.112 
The English attempts at codification also suggest that “objective” probability, rather 
than intention, was assuming core importance.
113
 The 1843 and 1846 reports of the Criminal 
Law Commissioners envisaged liability for collateral offences perpetrated “in pursuance of 
and in accordance with [the parties’] design” 114 (but with no indication of what this required, 
in terms of proof), with a probability analysis remaining limited to counselling and 
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procuring.
115
 By the 1879 Criminal Code (Indictable Offences) Bill, however, this distinction 
had collapsed: parties were liable for what they “ought to have been known to be a probable 
consequence of the execution of [their] common intention”.116 This was apparently thought to 
be a statement of the contemporary legal position,
117
 but it is far clearer than the cases at the 
time were in its confirmation that probability was a general test. 
The nineteenth century colonial codes also focus on probable collateral offending
118
 
and what ought to have been foreseen by the parties as probable.
119
 These codes were also 
thought to be rationalisations of existing English law,
120
 suggesting further that probability 
was considered to be the overarching test in establishing whether a collateral offence was (at 
least in legal fiction, if not in fact) included within the parties’ common purpose. 
Significantly, the Codes deal with ordinary accessorial liability separately from common 
purpose scenarios, rendering the argument that ordinary aiding and abetting could suffice for 
all scenarios (which is, ultimately, the Supreme Court/Privy Council’s thesis) questionable. 
It is submitted that, once a proper view is taken of the nineteenth century authorities, a 
“subjective” element (but not necessarily intention to encourage or assist all of the principal’s 
offences, at least as the word intention is nowadays understood) was beginning to be insisted 
upon by some judges, but it was not consistently explained in terms of intention, rather than 
contemplation. Furthermore, intention was used loosely, and often in conjunction with 
probability assessments, in the nineteenth century. It is difficult to take much from them, and 
certainly very difficult, when everything is taken into consideration, to divine a consistent 
trend of authority requiring an intention to assist or encourage each of the principal’s 
offences. 
The next section will demonstrate that the twentieth century cases suggest a move to 
greater “subjectivity” (in conjunction with the defendant’s ability to give evidence at trial), 
but not necessarily towards intentional encouragement or assistance of each of the principal’s 
offences. It will be argued that the move was more clearly towards “subjective” foresight of 
collateral offences, culminating in Chan Wing-Siu. 
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VI. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (TO CHAN WING-SIU) 
As in the nineteenth century, most early twentieth-century cases were vague on the 
requirements of secondary liability.
121
 The law’s development in common purpose scenarios 
remained “erratic”. 122  Far from being directed precisely on the parties’ “subjective” 
intentions, juries were still told to establish the scope of the parties’ “unlawful design” with 
little (recorded) guidance on how to do so.
123
 
Where guidance was given to juries about collateral offending, it does not necessarily 
support the Supreme Court/Privy Council’s view of history. In R. v Pridmore, the trial judge 
directed the jury that the defendant was liable for collateral offences that “naturally follow”124 
from pursuing an agreement to poach. Phillimore J disagreed, and suggested that there needed 
to be a common purpose that included the intention to resist opposition, rather than merely 
poach.
125
 Yet it remained unclear what was required to establish such a common purpose, and 
the trial judge’s comments about the secondary parties’ “realisation” of the principal’s 
potential collateral offending were not criticised. Ultimately, the way in which the secondary 
party held his stick (aggressively, it appears) was taken to be evidence enough of the common 
purpose to use force.
126
 
To add to the interpretational difficulties, it is unclear from Pridmore how much force 
the secondary party had to have (implicitly) appreciated was part of the common purpose.
127
 
It is not clear that the “common purpose” (however established) had to stretch to serious 
violence or lethal force in order to affix liability for murder, as Collison had suggested. If it 
did not have to stretch that far, then, structurally, Pridmore can be read consistently with the 
existence of PAL: intentional encouragement of the use of (some) force (Offence A) could 
ground liability for a collateral murder that the secondary parties did not intend to encourage 
or assist (Offence B). 
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 Pridmore can be compared with R. v Pearce,
128
 where the jury was told it would have 
to find an “arrangement” to use force if disturbed, and the existence of a common purpose 
“not merely to poach, but also to resist apprehension at all costs, even by violence if 
necessary”,129 if it was to convict. The defendant had run away when his group was disturbed, 
and there was a concern that the trial judge had “misled” the jury to think that “the mere fact 
that [the parties] were out poaching together by night justified them in convicting both of any 
assault committed by one”.130 But the earlier authorities are clear that secondary parties can 
withdraw from a criminal venture and thereby relieve themselves of further liability.
131
 Pearce 
had withdrawn. Furthermore, it is simply not clear what exactly would establish Pearce’s 
liability,
132
 and the presumption of intention from natural and probable consequences still 
applied.
133
 Judges were thus not as careful to distinguish between intention/foresight and 
probability/foreseeability. Judicial comments must therefore be read cautiously. 
 Contemporary textbooks fail to resolve matters, even if they broadly support the need 
for a common purpose to resist opposition with force in (at least some) murder cases. For 
instance, the 1926 edition of Kenny’s Outlines states that:134 
 
An aider and abettor is only liable for such crimes committed by the principal in the first 
degree as were done in execution of their common purpose. Thus if burglars find themselves 
interrupted by the master of the house which they have broken into, and one of them shoots 
him, the other burglar [not be] liable for this murder, unless they had jointly resolved to resist 
interruption at any cost. [Emphasis added.] 
 
No relevant cases are cited in support of this proposition, and there is no discussion of what 
this common resolution involved in terms of proof. Other secondary sources from the 1920s 
suggest that contemplation of the collateral offence was vital in such cases involving aiders 
and abettors, yet do not say that this was mere evidence that the secondary party had 
intentionally encouraged or assisted the collateral offence
135
 (which is what the Supreme 
Court/Privy Council suggested that it was).
136
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 Despite these moves in the direction of “subjectivity”, traces of the “objective”, 
probability-based approach occurred relatively far into the twentieth century in cases 
involving principals in the second degree (aiders and abettors). In R. v Betts and Ridley,
137
 for 
example, the parties agreed to rob the victim (Offence A). The victim was killed during the 
robbery (Offence B). Ridley claimed that he agreed to a push, not further violence. It was held 
that Betts had merely altered the level of violence required to reach the agreed criminal 
objective.
138
 Ridley was thus “actually a party and privy to an act which was calculated in the 
judgment of ordinary people to cause death”,139 and rightly convicted of murder. It is not clear 
whether this was a simple invocation of felony murder, or an application of a probability-
based model of PAL.
140
 Either way, intentional assistance or encouragement of each of the 
principal’s offences was not insisted upon.141 Other judicial statements from around the same 
time suggest an acceptance that acts beyond what the parties actually intended were at issue 
in common purpose cases.
142
 Even though it was (still) said that such acts were part of the 
common purpose, it was becoming clearer that this was intellectually dishonest. 
 By the mid-twentieth century, then, not all cases involving homicide rested on a 
settled common purpose to resist opposition with force, and those that did remained opaque 
regarding what this involved in terms of proof, and when the felony murder rule would 
straightforwardly apply. In the 1950 edition of Russell on Crime, edited by evangelical 
subjectivist Turner,
143
 it was still suggested: “that the true rule of law is, that where several 
persons engage in the pursuit of a common unlawful object, and one of them does an act 
which the others ought to have known was not improbable to happen in the course of 
pursuing such common unlawful object, all are guilty.”144 If the law had developed by the late 
nineteenth century to require an actual intention to encourage or assist Offence B (as the 
Supreme Court/Privy Council suggested), or even contemplation of Offence B, this was not 
noted over fifty years later by a leading criminal law commentator.
145
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Even when “subjectivity” appeared to be insisted upon, an intention to assist or 
encourage the collateral offence was not. For instance, in Davies v DPP, Lord Simonds LC 
noted, obiter, that:
146
 
 
I can see no reason why, if half a dozen boys fight another crowd, and one of them produces a 
knife and stabs one of the opponents to death, all the rest of his group should be treated as 
accomplices in the use of a knife and the infliction of mortal injury by that means, unless there 
is evidence that the rest intended or concerted or at least contemplated an attack with a knife 
by one of their number, as opposed to a common assault. If all that was designed or envisaged 
was in fact a common assault, and there was no evidence that [the defendant], a party to that 
common assault, knew that any of his companions had a knife, then [the defendant] was not an 
accomplice in the crime consisting in its felonious use. [Emphasis added.] 
 
It is not clear whether contemplation was intended by Lord Simonds to be a sufficient 
condition for liability,
147
 but it was viewed as an alternative to intention. This casts doubt on 
the proposition that contemplation was mere evidence of intention, and nothing more, as the 
Supreme Court/Privy Council suggested in Jogee.
148
 
Although one should hesitate before making grand claims based on vague, pre-1950 
authorities and an obiter comment, it was at least possible that, by the mid 1950s, mere 
contemplation of the collateral crime was beginning to be required to bring an act within the 
parties’ (constructed) common purpose. On the argument defended in this article, there had 
never been strong recognition of the need to prove that a secondary party intended to 
encourage or assist all of the principal’s crimes, and so no climb-down to 
contemplation/foresight occurred. 
 Indeed, the view that the requisite “subjective” element was only just beginning to 
form by the 1950s might explain why references to probability persevered. In R. v Grant,
149
 
the defendants plotted to tie up and use light force against the porter at the hotel they were 
burgling. The principal used extreme violence on the porter, killing him. The parties’ 
convictions for murder were upheld, but Grant did not agree to the level of violence used. It is 
not even clear if he contemplated it. The level of violence used was, however, viewed as a 
probable consequence of the plan to commit burglary and assault the porter.
150
 Of course, the 
felony murder rule still applied at that time, but it was abolished in 1957.
151
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 In the 1958 edition of Russell on Crime, the statement about what the secondary party 
ought to have known was replaced by Turner with a reference to what “the evidence shows 
was within [the secondary party’s] contemplation”, though no cases are cited to explain this 
change in approach.
152
 The abolition of the felony murder rule would only explain a change of 
approach in murder cases: a bare felony would certainly no longer be enough (though it had 
not been treated as such, at least consistently, for some time). Yet it is instructive that Turner 
did not require that the secondary party intended to encourage or assist Offence B. Williams, 
by contrast, did note cases such as Collison in 1961, and viewed contrary authorities as 
unreliable.
153
 He nevertheless suggested that a common intention to threaten violence “is 
equivalent to a common intent to use violence, for the one so easily leads to the other”.154 
This savours of recognition that collateral Offence B (violence) was a probable consequence 
of pursuing the plan to commit Offence A (the threat). It is not clear from Williams’s 
discussion that contemplation of the use of violence was even required. 
The cases continued to be largely inconsistent into the 1960s. In R. v Spraggett,
155
 the 
Court of Appeal held that a “preconceived intention” to commit a crime of violence as well as 
the burglary was necessary before a conviction for the collateral offence of murder could 
follow. The court did not explain what this “preconceived intention” entailed in terms of 
proof. The presumption of intention from natural and probable consequences still applied at 
this stage, so it might have been sufficient that the collateral offence was a probable offshoot 
of the planned crime, or had at least been contemplated as such. Without this gloss, Spraggett 
is difficult to square with subsequent cases. In R. v Betty,
156
 for example, the parties agreed to 
attack the victim, but did not intend to kill him. The trial judge had explained that the 
defendant could not be convicted of murder as a secondary party unless he contemplated the 
use of fatal or serious violence and the conviction was upheld. This suggests that 
contemplation was acceptable as the lowest form of fault required for secondary liability 
flowing from a common unlawful purpose.
157
 The defendant was convicted of manslaughter 
on the basis that he had not envisaged death or serious bodily harm resulting from the 
common purpose. 
                                                 
152
 J.W.C. Turner, Russell on Crime: A Treatise of Felonies and Misdemeanors, 11
th
 edn., vol. 1 (London 1958), 
152. See Smith, Complicity, 213-214. 
153
 cf. Williams, Criminal Law, 397 (n. 4). 
154
 ibid. 397-398. 
155
 [1960] Crim. L.R. 840. 
156
 (1963) 48 Cr. App. R. 6. 
157
 cf. Jogee, at [30]. 
  25 
There then followed two five-judge decisions from the Court of Appeal. In R. v 
Smith,
158
 the court focussed on the secondary party’s “foresight of consequences”, noting 
that:
159
  
 
It must have been clearly within the contemplation of a man like Smith who … had almost 
gone berserk himself to have left the public-house only to get bricks to tear up the joint, that if 
the bar tender did his duty to quell the disturbance and picked up the night stick, anyone 
whom he knew had a knife in his possession … might use it on the barman ... By no stretch of 
imagination, in the opinion of this court, can that be said to be outside the scope of the 
concerted action in this case. [Emphasis added.] 
 
All Smith did, if the argument presented above is accepted, is give support to the developing 
line of authority that mere probability of collateral offending was no longer enough for PAL, 
and that contemplation/foresight of the collateral crime was necessary.
160
 The trial judge’s 
statements regarding intention are – on this view – to be treated with extreme care.161 Just 
because the trial judge said “intention” (still, at that time, presumed from “objective” 
probability) was required, does not mean that that was the minimum level of fault consistent 
with secondary liability. The decision was read at the time to suggest that contemplation of 
the collateral offence was necessary and sufficient.
162
 If a contemplation/foresight-based rot 
did set in during the twentieth century, then, this happened long before 1984.
163
  
In the second five-judge decision, R. v Anderson and Morris,
164
 the court approved the 
contention of Geoffrey Lane QC (later Lord Lane CJ) that the scope of the “joint enterprise” 
was crucial to establishing secondary liability,
165
 but said nothing about how it was to be 
established.
166
 The question is not answered in Anderson and Morris,
167
 which was mainly 
about unforeseeable changes to the common plan by the principal – which would relieve the 
putative secondary party of liability. But unforeseeable collateral offending would not even 
have fallen within the probability-based version of PAL that had existed (initially perhaps 
only in relation to counselling and procuring) from around the late seventeenth century, never 
mind the contemplation/foresight-based version that was developing (if falteringly) by the 
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1960s. It is noteworthy that emphasis was placed in Anderson and Morris on whether the 
principal “acted in a way which no party to [the] common design could suspect”.168 Again, it 
is not clear if suspicion would have been sufficient fault to bring the principal’s offending 
within the responsibility of the secondary party, but it is not ruled out. 
 Following the demise of the presumption of intention and foresight from probable 
consequences (October 1967),
169
 and the abolition of the accessories before the fact/principals 
in the second degree distinction (January 1968),
170
 it might be expected that the law’s 
approach would at last become consistent, but it did not. In R. v Lovesay,
171
 for example, 
liability required a “common design … [to use] whatever force was necessary to achieve the 
robbers’ object”,172 but it seemed to be enough that the defendant “envisaged” that resistance 
would need to be overcome.
173
 That said, neither the decided cases, nor contemporary 
secondary literature,
174
 are crystal clear. 
Indeed, some cases do appear to insist on an intention to encourage or assist each of 
the principal’s offences. In R. v Reid, Lawton LJ held that:175  
 
When two or more men go out together in joint possession of offensive weapons such as 
revolvers and knives and the circumstances are such as to justify an inference that the very 
least they intend to do with them is to use them to cause fear in another, there is … always a 
likelihood that in the excitement and tensions of the occasion, one of them will use his weapon 
in some way which will cause death or serious injury. If such injury was not intended by the 
others, they must be acquitted of murder; but having started out on an enterprise which 
envisaged some degree of violence, albeit nothing more than causing fright, they will be guilty 
of manslaughter. [Emphasis added.] 
 
Reid appears to be strong support for the Supreme Court/Privy Council’s argument that, prior 
to 1984, secondary parties had to intend to encourage or assist, and actually encourage or 
assist, each of the principal’s offences.176 The court’s decision in Reid was, however, viewed 
by J.C. Smith at the time as merely being “in accordance with the established law” described 
in the third edition of Smith and Hogan.
177
 There, it is said that if the secondary party 
expected the principal to use the knife with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, that was 
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murder,
178
 and the importance of foresight of the principal’s crime was emphasised, but not 
connected (at least explicitly) with a requirement of intention.
179
 Once again, it is not clear 
that intentional assistance or encouragement of Offence B was, in the end, required. 
Other authorities from around the same period support the view that contemplation or 
foresight of the principal’s crime could be sufficient to secure secondary liability. In R. v 
Penfold,
180
 Shaw LJ noted that the defendants could “hardly fail to contemplate” the necessity 
of violence, and they had implicitly agreed “to put themselves under the dictates of any 
arising necessity”.181 It remained unclear whether this contemplation was a necessary and 
sufficient condition of liability. Although an alternative reading of the case is that the 
secondary parties had accepted that violence was indeed what they were planning (and 
“conditionally intended” it), contemplation of violence could well have been necessary and 
sufficient to affix liability. This dubiety is sufficient to cast doubt on the Supreme Court/Privy 
Council’s historical account. Chan Wing-Siu could, on this contemplation-as-sufficient view, 
simply have confirmed what, by the late 1970s, was the best gloss put on the cases regarding 
common unlawful purpose.
182
 The law had narrowed after the sixteenth century’s harsh 
approach, from concentrating on probable crimes committed in pursuit of the common 
purpose (through the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries – initially in counselling and 
procuring, and later generally) to contemplated crimes committed in pursuit of the common 
purpose. In another sense, the law’s reach had broadened, in that possible (even if not 
probable) foreseen collateral crimes were seemingly included. 
This question of possibility versus probability was addressed first in Australia. In R. v 
Johns,
183
 Barwick CJ contended that the parties’ common purpose included “all those 
contingencies which can be held to have been in the contemplation of the participants, or 
which in the circumstances ought necessarily to have been in such contemplation.”184 The 
defence conceded that contemplation of Offence B was enough, but objected to contemplation 
of a possibility being sufficient.
185
 It was concluded that it was.
186
 The Supreme Court/Privy 
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Council thought that Johns supported its approach, and was consistent with its reading of 
Collison.
187
 Admittedly the judges’ statements in Johns are inconsistent,188 but that makes 
claims about it reflecting an “orthodox”189 and “long-standing” position,190 or having a clear 
ratio,
191
 problematic. 
It has been argued that the trend in the twentieth century cases was towards identifying 
a “subjective” element beyond the intention to encourage or assist Offence A, but this was not 
necessarily an intention to encourage or assist Offence B. The Supreme Court/Privy Council 
bases its contrary thesis on eight twentieth-century cases (Spraggett, Betty, Smith, Anderson 
and Morris, Reid and Johns).
192
 Many of these authorities are at best inconclusive, and at 
worst inconsistent with the intention-based account. Requiring simple contemplation of 
Offence B is, it is submitted, consistent with a far greater number of authorities, and 
represents a proper “subjective” equivalent of the “objective” probability focus that 
dominated earlier discussions of accessorial liability. That, it is submitted, is the best 
historical account of the law before 1984. Indeed, in the 1983 edition of his Textbook, 
Williams suggested that “It is now clear that if D1 and D2 set out to rob, and D2 knows that 
D1 may be carrying a gun and may use it, D2 will be an accomplice in an offence committed 
by D1 with the gun, if it is in the course of the robbery or of escaping afterwards.”193 The 
pivotal question can now, thus, be answered: did the Privy Council take a bold new step in 
Chan Wing-Siu? 
 
 
VII. WAS CHAN WING-SIU NEW? 
In light of the discussion above, the thesis that the Privy Council’s decision in Chan Wing-Siu 
bucked a clear trend in endorsing intention as the fault element in all instances of secondary 
liability, and introduced a “new principle”194 that changed “the common law in a way which 
made it more severe… widening the scope of secondary liability by the introduction of new 
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doctrine”,195 is highly suspect. Although it was claimed in Jogee that Chan Wing-Siu was 
“based on an incomplete, and in some respects erroneous, reading of the previous case 
law”,196 the Supreme Court/Privy Council cannot escape a similar charge. The court cited 
selectively, giving the most sympathetic view of history that it could. On the alternative 
history argued for in this article, which it is submitted explains more of the decided cases, 
Chan Wing-Siu (despite the Privy Council citing few cases) simply confirmed what was 
already becoming clearer in the case law: there was a “wider principle” (i.e. PAL) beyond 
standard aiding and abetting, “whereby a secondary party is criminally liable for acts by the 
primary offender of a type which the former foresees but does not necessarily intend”.197 
Indeed, the appellants in Chan Wing-Siu do not seem to have argued otherwise, basing their 
case on the requirement of foresight of a probability of collateral offending, rather than 
suggesting intention was the relevant standard (although they maintained the intellectual 
muddle of claiming there to be “tacit agreement” regarding Crime B where in fact there was 
none).
198
  
The intellectual honesty of Chan Wing-Siu was that it was no longer pretended that the 
collateral offence was within the common purpose, even conditionally; at last, the law 
admitted that it was not, yet remained the secondary party’s responsibility. Unfortunately, 
some intellectual dishonesty remained due to the mentions of “authorisation”, “consensus” 
and “tacit” agreement, where in fact there was bare foresight of the collateral offending.199 
But these were unnecessary embellishments. As the Privy Council explained: “The criminal 
culpability lies in participating in the venture with [foresight of Crime B]”.200 The House of 
Lords later clarified this point in Powell and English,
201
 where it was confirmed (albeit with 
some reservations)
202
 that foresight of the collateral offending was necessary and sufficient in 
PAL cases. Short of being aberrations, then, it is submitted that Chan Wing-Siu and Powell 
and English were helpful clarifications of the law. 
Indeed, had the decision in Chan Wing-Siu been as revolutionary and flawed as the 
Supreme Court/Privy Council suggested, one might have expected this to be noticed. Yet, in 
1984, J.C. Smith described the Privy Council’s decision as “a valuable restatement and 
                                                 
195
 ibid. at [74]. 
196
 ibid. at [79]. 
197
 Chan Wing-Siu, 175. 
198
 ibid. at 170-171. 
199
 Jogee, at [65]-[66]. cf. B. Krebs, “Mens Rea in Joint Enterprise: A Role for Endorsement?” (2015) 74 C.L.J. 
480, 493-495 (hereafter Krebs, “Endorsement”). 
200
 Chan Wing-Siu, 175. 
201
 [1999] 1 A.C. 1 (seen by Smith as a “valuable clarification”: [1998] Crim. L.R. 48, 49). 
202
 At 10-11. 
  30 
clarification of … the law”.203 This was not simply a case of the significance of the decision 
being missed in its immediate aftermath. In 1997, Smith stated that: “It would be quite wrong 
to suppose that parasitic accessorial liability … is a recent development in the law, an 
innovation by the Privy Council in Chan Wing-Siu.”204 Similarly, Spencer, writing in 1985, 
thought that the Privy Council’s decision was consistent with the contemporary English 
approach,
205
 not a new development.
206
 The 1985 edition of Archbold mentions Chan Wing-
Siu only once, without adverse comment.
207
 Although the case was not initially applied 
universally,
208
 the Court of Appeal endorsed it fairly promptly.
209
 
Once the dust had settled, some authors began to question the efficacy of the decision 
in Chan Wing-Siu.
210
 In 1987, Dennis presaged the Supreme Court/Privy Council’s decision 
in Jogee by reading Chan Wing-Siu to be a case about so-called “conditional intention”; 
otherwise, it was a “dubious” decision, due to the tightening in the mens rea of murder (for 
principals) after 1984.
211
 Yet, in his magisterial 1991 work on complicity, K.J.M. Smith 
thought that Chan Wing-Siu had merely gone “some way to (finally) settling the [fault 
element of secondary liability for collateral crimes], although distinct traces of confusion are 
still discernible in the use of consensus terminology”.212 As noted above, that confusion was 
removed in Powell and English. 
The claim that Chan Wing-Siu was a “wrong turn”, and departing from it was in large 
part a matter of precedent (and therefore constitutionally straightforward), is thus 
unconvincing. The more compelling reading of Jogee is that the Supreme Court/Privy 
Council engaged in substantive law reform. This could have been made explicit, and the 
decision sold as a continuation of the historical narrowing of PAL. Just as the law had moved 
from a focus on: (i) furthering the common purpose, to (ii) probable collateral offending, to 
(iii) contemplated/foreseen collateral offending, it was now moving to focus on (iv) 
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intentional encouragement/assistance of the collateral crime, thus rendering PAL conceptually 
identical to ordinary aiding and abetting (and redundant). Many would have viewed such a 
judicial change as desirable, regarding PAL – a judicial development – as the genesis of much 
injustice.
213
 Being explicit about the change would, however, have meant engaging more 
directly with the proper process of revisiting previous decisions,
214
 and raised more clearly 
constitutional concerns about judicial activism. Although the Supreme Court/Privy Council is 
no doubt right that corrections of clear common law “errors” are largely unproblematic 
constitutionally,
215
 there are clearer concerns raised by more substantive reform of even the 
common law
216
 (as the prosecution maintained in Jogee).
217
 The reasons the change in Jogee 
is problematic, once the alleged precedential “error” has been exposed as a smokescreen, are 
as follows: (i) the law as stated (defensibly, as shown above) in Chan Wing-Siu had been 
relatively settled for over 30 years; (ii) requiring intentional encouragement or assistance for 
all secondary liability was not a reform the Law Commission had proposed when it had 
considered accessorial liability;
218
 and (iii) Parliament had not apparently contemplated 
reforming the law, despite recent encouragement to do so.
219
 Once that shield of precedent 
and history has been shattered, the question is whether the other reasons provided by the 
Supreme Court/Privy Council in Jogee
220
 justified such dramatic law reform being undertaken 
by the courts, not the legislature. It is unfortunate that this question was so easily avoided in 
Jogee, but this paper opens up the possibility for it to be addressed more straightforwardly in 
the future. Jogee should be seen for what it is: significant judicial law reform, not common 
law housekeeping. 
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